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CAMPUS NOTES.
THE FoRUM extends the sympathy of
the students of the Law School to Prof. J.
M. Weakley il his recent bereavement.
The third of a series of six informal
dances was held by the Comus Club, in
Armory Hall, Saturday evening, February
6th. The dance was highly successful.
The Year Book of Dickinson College,
comprising Dickinson Preparatory School,
Dickinson College, and Dickinson School
of Law, has just been issued. It consists
of 142 pages, and is a very artistic cata-
logue. _
Several students of the Law School have
accepted positions with the Pittsburg
Aluminum Company for the Summer va-
cation.
The Law School Basketball Team was
defeated by the York Basketball Team,
Friday evening, Feb. 5th, by the score of
30 to 5.
The first of a series of lectures given by
Prof. J. Al. Weakley was held Friday
evening, Feb. 5th, in the main recitation
room of the Law School. His subject was,
"Justices of the Peace in Pennsylvania."
CLASS NOTES.'
Flynn, '04, spent Jan. 23-30th in Rey-
noldsville, being called there on account
of the death of his grandmother.
Yocum, '04, was initiated into the Car-
lisle Lodge of Elks Tuesday evening, Feb.
2nd. Rumor has it that, during the pro-
gress of the initiation, he was "' scalped."
Lanard, '04, Wilcox, '04, Hubler, '04,
Henneke, '05, and Jack, '06, attended the
reception at Wilson College Tuesday even-
ing, Feb. 2nd.
Reno, '05, returned to his home, in Al-
lentown, on account of illness.
Park, '05, will not return to the Law
School this year.
FRATERNITY NOTES.
Jos. E. Oyer, '05, was initiated into
Delta Chi Friday evening, Jan. 29th.
The Delta Chi Fraternity had their an-
nual group picture taken Saturday after-
noon, Jan. 30th.
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The Theta Lambda Phi Fraternity ten-
dered an informal reception to the Wilson
College girls, who were in town Saturday,
Jan. 23d, for the purpose of attending the
Comus Club dance that evening.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Francis J. Weakley, '95, died of pneu-
monia at Scranton Jan. 22nd, and was
buried in Carlisle Jan. 25th. He was a
son of Prof. J. M. Weakley, of the Law
School.
Geo. B. Somerville, '97, is practicing
law, and is the President of the Lake
Trade Coal Co., at Windber, Pa.
Thomas K. Leidy, '97, is Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney in Reading, Pa.
Albert I. Livingston, '97, is a journalist
at Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Isaac Wingert, '97, and wife, of Cham-
bersburg. visited Carlisle friends Feb. 4th.
Harry W. Savidge, '97, was elected one
of the Democratic State delegates from
Northumberland county.
Clarence Raymond Gilliland, '98, is an
electrical engineer with the Westinghouse
Electric and Manufacturing Co., at East
Pittsburg, Pa.
Fred. B. Moser, '98, is practicing law at
Shamokin, Pa., being a member of the
firm of Lark & Moser. He is a candidate
for the Republican nomination for District
Attorney of Northumberland county.
Harry P. Conley, '98, is located in Sha-
mokin, being associated with his father
and brother in the firm of J. H. Couley &
Sons, hardware merchants.
Gabriel H. Moyer, '98, is a member of
the law firm of Siegrist & Moyer, doing
business at Lebanon, Pa.
John 0. Miller, '99, is practicing law at
York, Pa., and is attorney for the York-
Coalinga Oil Co.
J. Wilmer Fisher, '99, is practicing law
at Reading, Pa.
H. Franklin Kantner, '99, is practicing
law at Reading, Pa.
Albert T. Morgan, '01, is practicing law
at Washington, Pa.
L. R. Holcomb, '01, has law offices at
Wilkesbarre, Pa. He was a member of the
last Legislature of Pennsylvania.
Berton B. Barr, '01, is practicing law at
Washington, Pa.
John Kemp, '01, is building up a lucra-
tive practice at Hazleton, Pa.
Robert Holden Moon, '02, was married
on Jan. 6th to Miss Amy Lowry Hutchin-
son, at Parkersburg, W. Va.
E. B. Williamson, '03, was admitted to
the York County Bar Jan. 19th, and has
successfully passed the Supreme Court ex-
amination.
Thos. B. Wilson, '03, an attorney of
Bradford, Pa., took a business trip to the
Pacific Coast during December and Jan-
uary.
H. A. Gross, '03, was admitted to the
York County Bar Jan. 19th, and has suc-
cessfully.passed theSupreme Court exami-
nation.
Albert S. Longbottom, '03, of Philadel-
phia, recently suffered a slight attack of
pneumonia.
Jas. J. Logan, ex-'04, spent Jan. 29th in
town.
Walter P. Bishop, '03, and Albert S.
Longbottom, '03, have succeeded in pass-
ing the Supreme Court examination.
ANNUAL PRIZES.
The Wrn. D. Boyer Prize, No. 1, of $25,
will be given to the member of the Junior
class that does the best work in Contracts.
The Win. D. Boyer Prize, No. 2, of $25,
will be given to such member of the Mid-
dle class as does the best work in Evidence.
The 1st Dean's Prize will be awarded to
the member of the Senior class that shall
have done the best work in Constitutional
Law.
The 2nd Dean's Prize will be awarded
to the Junior who does the best work in
the law of Real Property.
The Win. C. Allison Prize will be given
to the Middler that does the best work in
the law of Decedents' Estates.
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MOOT COURT.
JNO. WILSON vs. SARAH BRAITH-
WAITE.
Surrender of deed-The surrender of a
deed upon consideration estops grantee
from further assertion of title-Attorn-
ment of tenant to landlord normally pre-
cludes lenant from denying title Qf land-
lord-Taking deed from private papers
of grantee after his death is no delivery
and passes no title; there must be actual
delivery, with intention to deliver, and
grantor must be alive-Mfarried women
-Size can only divest her interest in land
in manner provided by statute-She is
not estopped by acts which estop afeme
sole-Equity follows the law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Wilson conveyed, for $2,000, a house to
Sarah Teller, wife of John Teller, and the
Tellers took possession. Six months later
Sarah Teller became dissatisfied with the
bargain, and, at the instance of John,
begged Wilson to return the money and
accept the deed. Wilson repaid the money
and received back his deed, and the Tellers
continued as tenants in the house, paying
$100 yearly rent. Two years later Wilson
died, and Sarah Teller (his sister), finding
the deed undestroyed, took it. The son
of Wilson brings this ejectment against
his aunt, who, Teller having died, has be-
come the wife of Samuel Braithwaite.
JONES for plaintiff.
A parol assignment of a deed is legal.
Barnwid v. Kuhn, 36 Pa. 390. There is
no presumption of delivery of a deed where
grantee holds under suspicious circum-
stances. Rine v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30;
Cable v. Cable, 146 Pa. 451. There can be
no delivery after death of grantor. Shoen-
berger v. Zook, 34 Pa. 24; Durand's Ap-
peal, 116 Pa. 93. The attornment of the
tenant estops the tenant from setting up
title against the landlord.
EHLER for defendant.
A surrender cannot be made in this in-
formal way. It requires a formal convey-
ance recognized by law. Tiedeman on
Real Property, 741. Re-delivery of an
unrecorded deed by grantee to grantor is
ineffectual for purpose of revesting title.
Botsford v. Morehouse et al., 4 Conn. 550 ;
Starr v. Starr, 1 Ohio 221 ; Jackson v.
Chase, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 84; Rogers v.
Rogers, 53 Wis. 86. The decisions against
the general rule are based on the rule of
evidence, that grantee will not be per-
mitted to introduce parol evidence to estab-
lish contents of deed where he destroys
the primary evidence. Lawrence v. Strat-
ten, 6 Cush. 103 ; Raynor v. Wilson, 6 Hill
(N. Y.) 469; Wiley v. Christ, 4 Watts,
199. Here deed was not destroyed ; there is
no necessity to introduce secondary proof.
Plaintiff must recover on the strength of
his own title.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Counsel for defendant contends that re-
covery by the plaintiff must be on the
strength of his own title. Then arises the
question, "Did any right or title descend
to the son of Wilson in the premises in dis-
pute ?" Before determining this, it muat
be decided whether or not the parol recon-
veyance of the property was valid. If it
was, the son of Wilson received the title
sufficient to recover on its strength.
Generally a parol contract for the sale of
land is void at law. In actions of eject-
ment, though, which are substitutes for
bills in equity, the plaintiff can recover on
such a contract if he shows by clear, une-
quivocal and convincing evidence, suffi-
cient to satisfy fully the conscience of a
Chancellor, a contract complete in its,
terms, and such a performance or partial
performance, including a taking possession
in pursuance of the contract as would
make it unjust and inequitable not to exe-
cute the contract. 120 Pa. 49. Its equity
must be apparent, involving no doubt, and
wanting in no requisites necessary to move
the conscience. 120 Pa. 138. This case
falls within the rule thus laid down, and
fully answers its requirements.
The contract was complete in its terms,
as it appears that John Teller, for his wife,
made an offer to Wilson to return the deed
if the grantor should repay the purchase
money, and Wilson accepted the offer by
handing it back for the deed in dispute.
The performance of the contract as re-
spects the taking of possession was suffi-
cient. Mrs. Teller, for two years after the
reconveyance, paid rent to Wilson, thus
acknowledging a superior title in him to
the occupied premises. The relations of
landlord and tenant were fully established.
The possession of a tenant is the possession
of his landlord, and when the relation is
once established it cannot be destroyed
during the occupancy of the tenant, with-
out express notice to the landlord that the
tenant holds adversely. 18 Superior 245.
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No evidence is shown to support a pre-
sumption that the tenant held adversely,
except the possession of the deed by Sarah
Braithwaite after the death of Wilson.
In the absence of suspicious circumstances,
her possession of it would beprimafacie
evidence of its delivery to her. But this
case is not free from such circumstances.
Mrs. Teller became dissatisfied with the
bargain, and, at her intercession, the
grantor rescinded the contract and placed
her whereshe desired to be. She was sat-
isfied, and paid rent for two years thereaf-
ter, until, by a discovery on her part, she
regained possession of the deed and then
attempted to hold adversely to the heir at
law, the son of Wilson. Such actions are
extremely suspicious, and, the plaintiff
having proved them so, destroys the pre-
sumption that the possession of the deed
by defendant was the result of its delivery
to her, therefore, its possession could not
be evidence that Mrs. Braithwaite gave
Wilson express notice that she held ad-
versely as landlord. No other means of
express notice was alleged by the defend-
ant, but on the contrary, she, by the pay-
ment of rent, expressly recognized the re-
lationship of landlord and tenant.
The plaintiff in ejectmeut must recover
on the strength of his own title, either as
beiig good against all the world, or as be-
ing good as against the defendant by estop-
pel. This rifle must be limited, and ex-
plained by the nature of each case as it
arises. 18 L. R. A. 781.
The plaintiff has shown that the parol
assignment to his father was valid, and,
therefore ht right to the premises and his
right of possession necessary to support
this action of ejectment. The defendant
is estopped from showing the strength of
her title by the fact of the suspicious cir-
cum. atxesattending her possession of the
deed. To permit her to hold the property
against the plaintiff would be an approval
of attempted fraud against the heir at law.
The return of the deed, and the retaking
of the purchase money, followed by the
subsequent action of the parties, estopped
the grantee and her heirs from invoking
the aid of the deed then in her possession.
3 Pennypacker 199.
The conclusion is, that Wilson, the heir
at law, has shown a valid legal title to the
disputed premises; therefore, judgment
entered upon the verdict for plaintiff for
the property described in the writ of eject-
ment.
GEORGE E. WOLFE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The situation before us is briefly this:
A sale of real estate is consummated ; the
grantee goes into possession, and continues
undisputed owner for six months. The
parties then, by mutual consent, attempt
a parol rescission of the executed sale by a
return of the deed and the money. The
grantee has since recognized the title of
her grantor by paying him rent as land-
lord. The grantee now sets up her title,
and reinforces her claim with the old deed,
which she has found among the papers of
her grantor. The heir of the grantee
brings ejectment. The situation is com-
plicated by the fact that the grantee was
afeme covert when the rescission was at-
tempted, and is so now, though with a
different husband.
In the first place, it is clear that the
present defendant was atone timeabsolute
owner of the property in dispute, and that
she continued such for the space of six
months. At this date the parties mani-
fested by their actions a clear intentio.i to
resume their original positions. The plain-
tiff contends that the law should enforce
this intention. The defendant replies that
a title once vested can only be divested by
a deed executed in the statutory mode.
It is probably safe to state that the aver-
age man, uninitiated into the intricacies
of the law, would infer that the return of
the instrument of conveyance to a grantor
would be as effective to carry back to him
the title as the tradition to the grantee
had been effective in transferring it in the
first instance. The number of cases in the
books involving this situation indicates
the prevalence of the impression, so that,
unless some ground for creating an excep-
tion to the above rule can be found, situa-
tions like the present will present a re-
curring spectacle of fraud unredressed.
A case involving hardships, in which
the rule was enforced, is found in Botsford
v. Morehouse et al., 4 Conn. 550. Some
time after the parties had returned the deed
and the consideration, the creditors of the
grantee levied an execution on the land,
and then recovered it in an ejectment
against the grantor. This decision is fol-
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lowed in 5 Conn. 86, and 5 Conn. 262. In
Wilson v. Still, 13 N. J. Eq. 143, a female
grantee returned the deed to her grantor,
requesting that lie make a new one, nam-
ing her husband as grantee. This was
done, but it was held, after the wife's
death, that the means adopted had been
inadequate for the accomplishment of their
purpose. That the mere return and can-
rellation of the deed at the instance of the
grantee will not effect a revesting of the
title in the grantor, is decided in a long
line of cases. See Raynor v. Wilson, 6
TiM 472; Marshall v. Fisk, 6 Mass. 32;
Chessman v. Wittemore, 23 Pick. 234;
Jackson v. Anderson, 4 Wend. 482.
The cases in which the courts have hesi-
tated have been those in which a grantee,
fi~lding himself unable to pay the purchase
money, has found someone who has agreed
to take the bargain off his hands. The
grantee is relieved from further liability
upon his surrender of his deed and the
grantor 'makes a new deed to the new
grantee. To forbid the first grantee to
later attack the title of the second grantee,
whom he has watched paying out his
money for a deed for land whose title the
first grantee knew was in himself, is but
to apply the equitable doctrine of estoppel
in pais. A number of cases rest on this
ground. See Com. v. Dudley, 10 Mass.
403; Holbrook v. Tirrell, 9 Pick. 105;
Lawrence v. Stratton, 6 Cush. 163; Tom-
son v. Ward, 1 N. H. 9; Gardner v.
McFallen, 79 Pa. 398.
In New Hampshire the cases go still
further. In Farras v. Farras, 4 N. H. 9,
while it is conceded that the title is not
strictly revested, yet, it is said, "the
grantee having voluntarily, and without
any misapprehension or mistake, con-
sented to the destruction of the deed, with
a view to revest the title, he is not to be
permitted to show the contents of the deed
by parol evidence. So that, there being
no competent evidence that the land ever
passed, the title is to be considered as hav-
ing always remained in the grantor." In
the case at bar, however, the defendant
comes armed with the deed.
Later New Hampshire cases discard the
evidence element in its rule, and say flatly
that "the redelivery, by a grantee to his
grantor, of an, unrecorded deed, with the
intention and express purpose of having it
caucelled, and of revesting the title in the
premises therein described, in the grantor,
hasprecisel.y the effect intended, upon the
principle of estoppel." Dodge v. Dodge,
33 N. H. 487 ; Mussey v. Holt, 24 N. H.
248; S. C. 55 Am. Dec. 234.
In Wiley v. Christ, 4 W. 196, though the
question was not in dispute, the court took
the position, that by the surrender of the
deed for destruction the grantee becomes
the trustee for his grantor. He firsttakes
the narrower ground that the grantee has
precluded himself from using parol evi-
dence of the deed's contents, but later takes
the broad ground that "in equity and good
conscience the grantee is precluded from
setting up and claiming under a deed which
he had voluntarily destroyed, and for the
doing of which he had received a consid-
eration equal to the value of the estate."
This position has been recently taken in
Clones v. Clones, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 339.
In Bane et al. v. Sutton, 3 Penny. 199, the
grantee continued in possession, and paid
rent to her quondam grantor, and the
court recognized the doctrine urged by the
counsel for the plaintiff in the present
case, that this fact added force to the es-
toppel.
Tie idea that the Statute of Frauds is an
obstacle to a recovery has been adequately
answered by the learned court below. The
plaintiff does not show a contract to con-
vey, but an attempt to convey. But, cer-
tainly, the greater includes the less. The
grantor has resumed possession through a
tenant (the grantee), and the entire con-
sideration for the reconveyance has been
paid. Such facts would justify a decree of
specific performance, and the question of
inproyements is of no importance. Brown
et al. v. Bailey et al., 159 Pa. 121 ; Miller
v. Zufall, ll Pa. 323.
As has been suggested, the dotrine of
estoppel has a double application to the
present defendant. Aside from the vol-
untary surrender of the deed, she has rec-
ognized the plaintiff's title by paying rent
for two years to his ancestor. This fact
alone will normally preclude a tenant from
showing that his landlord had no title at
the time the lease was granted. It is,
however, a recognized exception, that
when, by mistake, a tenant has really
taken a lease of his own land, this fact may
be shown (Taylor on Landlord and Ten-
IOI
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ant, sec. 89), or that he has acquired the
very title under which the lessor claims.
Elliott v. Smith, 23 Pa. 131.
The defendant will hardly contend that
the mere possession of a deed by her, in
which she is the grantee and the father of
the plaintiff the grantor, will confer on
her the title. The delivery of a deed is an
essential part of its execution, and the ex-
istence of the grantor, and his intent to
transfer title, are essential parts of the de-
livery. Taking the deed from among the
private papers of the grantor after his death
can, therefore, pass no title. Critchfield
v. Critchfield, 24 Pa. 100.
We now reach the question, "Does the
fact that the defendant was and is a mar-
ried woman protect her?" It is true that
the doctrine of estoppel has been invoked
against a married woman in matters as to
which she is not under disability. It has
been said that "a married woman, in her
dealings with the world, should be held to
the observance of the same good faith to
which others are bound; the protection
against liability upon contracts, which her
coverture affords, is for the prevention of
fraud, and she should not thereby be en-
abled, with impunity, to defraud others."
Grim's Appeal, 105 Pa. 382; Bucknor's
Estate, 136 Pa. 23. The defendant should
have made a deed. Her husband should
have joined with her, and she should have
acknowledged it. As she has not done so,
we may ask, "Does equity require us to
consider that as done which ought to have
been done?"
In Glidden v. Struples, 52 Pa, 400, and
a long line of cases following it, it has been
emphatically decided that a married
woman's interest in land cannot be di-
vested except in the manner pointed out
by the statute, and she can not be estopped
by acts or declarations which, in the case
of a feme sole, would operate as an estop-
pel. The hardship involved in Glidden v.
Struples was intense, yet it was emphati-
cally held that IIin regard to powers that
are in their nature statutable, equity must
follow the law, be the consideration ever
so meritorious. Otherwise, equity would
defeat the very policy of the legislative
enactments."
In the case at bar it is said that "Sarah,
at the instance of John, begged Wilson to
return the money," etc. But it has been
repeatedly decided that the only way his
consent can be shown is by his joinder in
her deed. Trimmer v. Heagy, 16 Pa. 484.
If married women may recover in eject-
ment lands which they have conveyed by
a deed deficient only in the husband's
joinder, how can the delivery of that which
does not even purport to be her deed be
more efficacious ? Her receipt and use of
the consideration is no bar to her recovery,
nor any ground for the interposition of
equity. Richards v. McClelland, 29 Pa.
385. Even had the plaintiff's father gone
into possession in person, and have made
valuable improvements, the position of the
defendant would still be invulnerable.
Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts 238 ; Carr v. Wal-
lace, 7 Watts 394; Rogers v. Walker, 6
Pa. 374. The facts were fully in the pos-
session of both parties, and a mistake as to
their legal effect is no ground for equitable
relief. McAnich v. Laughlin, 13 Pa. 371.
We must conclude, therefore, that, while
the plaintiff might have recovered had the
defendant been single, or a male, her cov-
erture enables her to commit this palpable
fraud. The only cases which aid the plain-
tiff rest on the doctrine of estoppel, and a
married woman cannot be estopped out of
her land. Further, Mr. Braithwaite has
not been heard from. His interest has
attached, and we do not know that he will
consent to join in a deed from the defend-
ant, even if she were personally bound to
make one. We do not attempt to recon-
cile the conclusion of Judge Orlady in
Clones v. Clones, 22 Super. Ct. 395.
Thej udgment for the plaintiffis reversed.
BOROUGH OF EASTON vs.
MCALLISTER.
Proper form of action-Liability of prop-
erty owner for injury to pedestrians
caused by excavating the streets-
Whether such negligence can be imputed
to the borough.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The borough permitted McAllister to
excavate its streets, to put down a private
sewer, on his promising to indemnify it
against liability from accidents resulting
from the excavation, etc. A pedestrian
fell into the unguarded excavation, was
hurt, and obtained ajudgment against the
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borough for $1,000. This is trespass against
McAllister to recover the indemnity. De-
fendant objects (1), the contract was
against public policy; (2), the action of
trespass is not appropriate.
JONE S for the plaintiff.
The borough can recover from McAllis-
ter, the author of the negligence, and the
formerj udgment is evidence of the amount
of the damages. Richiston v. Montgom-
ery, 79 N. Y. 6.5; Robbins v. Chicago, 4
Wall. 657; Village of Port Jarvis v. Bank,
96 N. Y. 550; Trickett on Borough Law,
498.
This action of trespass is appropriate.
Brookville v. Arthurs, 130 Pa. 501; Bor-
ough v. Warne, 106 Pa. 373; Wilt v.
Welsh, 6 Watts 9; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22
Pa. 54.
S EiqcER for the defendant.
The borough and defen'dant were joint
trespassers, and, therefore, would bejointly
liable. There is no contribution as be-
tween joint tort feasors. Armstrong Co.
v. Clarion Co., 66 Pa. 218; Boyer v. Bo-
lander, 129 Pa. 329.
If a contract existed between the borough
and McAllister, the action should be ex-
contractu, that is, assumpsit. Clark on
Contracts; Boyer v. Bolander, 129 Pa.
324.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The Act of May 16, 1891 (P. & L. 4219),
gives every municipal corporation author-
ity to lay out sewers and drains in any
street or alley. This, we think, refers to
the construction of public sewers, in which
case, in order to authorize the construc-
tion of the same by the borough, the bor-
ough council must first pass an ordinance
authorizing such construction. A resolu-
tion to construct such public sewer will
not do. Strohli v. Borough of Ephrata,
178 Pa. 50 ; Riebe v. Borough of Lansford,
18 Pa. C. C. R. 289.
This we believe to be the law concerning
a publicsewer. But the statement of facts
before us reads: "The borough 'permitted'
McAllister to excavate its streets and put
down a private sewer." Must the borough
also pass an ordinance to do this? Or will
a resolution do? Or shall we understand
the word "permitted" to mean that an
ordinance was passed authorizing the
same? We do not think it will admit of
any such construction. Then can a reso-
lution give such permission, and still he a
valid contract, this being a sewer?
In cases of necessity, the authorities of
a borough may license private individuals
to occupy public highways to a reasonable
extent for private purposes. Smith v. Si-
mons, 103 Pa. 32.
A private sewer, like a private drain,
(Smith v. Simons, siipra) is not of such
public importance as to necessitate the
passing of an ordinance in order to make
it a valid contract, and we therefore think
a resolution in this case would be sufficient
to make the contract valid.
This being so, the next question pre-
sented for our consideration is, is trespass
the proper action, or must the action be
brought in assumpsit?
An obligation may arise from an agree-
ment or froma tort. When the obligation
or duty is fixed or arisesby agreement, the
action is ex-contractu. But the obligation
is not always fixed by the parties. It may
be supplied by a custom, or by the law
itself; and where the obligation is so sup-
plied, and there is a violation, such viola-
tion may make a case of tort or a breach
of contract, at the election of the party in-
jured. Bigelow on Torts, 26; Bank of
Orange v. Brown, 3 Wend. 158. Was this
obligation then and its breach such as was
supplied by custom or law? If so, the ac-
tion in trespass will lie; if not, the action
must be in assumpsit.
Here McAllister agreed to indemnify the
borough against liability for accidents re-
sulting from the excavation. His obliga-
tion to it arose from the terms of their
agreement, and not by the breach of any
custom, warranty or law.
We, therefore, think the action should
have been in assumpsit; and further, we
do not think the borough can recover from
McAllister, even if trespass be admitted to
be the proper action, because we believe
they were joint tortfeasors, and therefore,
the one wrongdoer cannot enforce contri-
bution from the other. Boyer v. Bolander,
129 Pa. 324; Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co.,
66 Pa. 218. For these reasons we feel jus-
tified in non-suiting the plaintiff.
Fox, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The borough permitted McAllister to
excavate the street for the purpose of put-
ting down a sewer. This was no authority
to him to neglect the precautions needful
to prevent pedestrians from falling into the
ditch. By omitting these precautions he
became liable to those who suffered dam-
age in consequence.
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His omission is not imputable to the
borough. Owing tothe users of the streets
an oversight over them, its negligence
would consist, not in the omissions of
McAllister, but in its failure to discover
them and to adopt means to avoid the re-
sults of them. He and it are not joint
tortfeasors. The fact that each of them
was negligent, and that the injury to the
pedestrian would have been prevented had
either been careful, does not make both of
them jointly guilty. There is, therefore,
no reason why the borough, being com-
pelled to indemnify the pedestrian, may
not in turn receive reimbursement from
McAllister. Brookville v. Arthurs, 130
Pa. 501 ; 152 Pa. 334 ; Phila. Co. v. Trac-
tion Co., 165 Pa. 456; Reading City v.
Reiner, 167 Pa. 41.
As the law does not prohibit the borough
from obtaining an indemnity, it does not
refuse validity to a contract for such in-
demnity. There is no doubt that a suit
can be maintained upon the McAllister
contract. But, such is the relation of both,
that McAllister's act has obliged the bor-
ough to incur the alternative of expense
and labor to neutralize his negligence, or
of compensation to the injured pedestrian.
This is a wrong, of a tortious nature, re-
dress for which can be obtained by an ac-
tion of trespass. We doubt not that the
borough could have maintained assumpsit,
but wesee no reason for compelling it to
sue on the contract rather than on the
tort. For these reasons the judgment of
the learned court below must be reversed,
with v.f. d. n.
JOHN McCABE vs. PA. R. R. CO.
Negligence - Contributory n eliqence -
Negligence qf carrier not imputable to
passenqer-Joint tort feaso's.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
McCabe was being carried to a station
by the defendant, and was let off at the
station. McCabe and other passengers
mounted an omnibus to be driven into the
town. The street on which it was run-
ning crossed the track, and the train was
about commencing to move. The driver
of the omnibussaw the train, although it
did not ring or whistle; but believing he
could cross, urged his horses over the
track. The locomotive struck the hind
wheel of the omnibus, oversetting it. The
train usually stopped long enough to allow
the omnibus to cross the track before it
(the train) began to move. For some
reason it started one-half minute earlier
than usual. McCabe, a passenger, sues for
injuries arising from the overturning of the
vehicle.
Fox for the piaintiff.
The negligence of the carrier, direct or
contributory, cannot be imputed to the
passenger. Dean v. Pa. R. R., 129 Pa. 514;
Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 ; Jones v.
Lehigh and N. E. R. Co., 202 Pa. 83.
When a person suffers an injury because
of the negligence of two or more persons;
they arejoiutly liable, and may 'be sued
jointly or severally. Borough of Carlisle
v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 544 ; Dean v. Pa. R.
R., supra.
D. E. KAUTFINAN for the defendant.
"rhe failure of the omnibus driver to stop.
look and listen before attempting to cross
the track, is negligenceper se. R. R. Co.
v. James, 1 V. N. C. 68; Holden v. Pa,
R. R. Co., 169 Pa. 1 ; Shuban v. Phila. &
R. B.. R., 166 Pa. 354.
Action should have been against the cab
driver, his negligence was the proximate
cause, his duty of care was of highelt
order while that of R. R. Co. was of ordi-
narycare. Herretux. v. City of Lebanon,
149 Pa. 222; Phila. & Reading I. R. v.
Boyer, 97 Pa. 102.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
From the fact that the train started one-
half minute before the usual time, it can-
not be said that the engineer should have
exercised particular caution on approach-
ing the crossing, but it is at all times the
duty of such a company to exercise its
rights with a consideration and prudent
regard for the right and safety of others.
Penna. R. Co. v. Barret, 59 Pa. 259.
The engineer of the railroad company
was negligent in not blowing the whistle
or ringingthe bell, as required on approach-
ing a crossing-Reeves v. Delaware, L. &
V. R. Co., 30 Pa. 454; Coleman v. Penia.
R. Co., 195 Pa. 485; and as a result of his
failure to do so, the railroad company is
liable. Phila. & T. R. Co. v. Hogan, 47
Pa. 244.
It was set up as a defense by the railroad
company that the plaintiff's omnibus
driver was guilty of contributory negli-
gence in crossing the track when he knew
the train was about to start.
The clear duty of the omnibus driver,
wheq he came to the crossing, was to use
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every reasonable precaution to avoid in-
jury-Ash v. Wilmington & Northern R.
Co., 148 Pa. 138; and the failure of the en-
gineer to give warning did not exempt
him from this duty. lMcGill v. Railway,
152 Pa. 331.
The omnibus driver was negligent in not
ascertaining definitely whether it was safe
to cross, because he, as a common carrier,
is required to exercise the highest care and
diligence for the safety of the passenger.
Phila. City Pass. R. Co. v. Hassard, 75 Pa.
367; Willock v. Railroad Co., 166 Pa. 184;
Penna. R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315.
Both the omnibus driver-and the railroad
company being the cause of the injury,
was it proper to sue oneand not the other ?
The general rule of law is, where one
suffers injury through the concurrent neg-
ligence of two or more persons, they are
jointly liable, and may be prosecuted
against for the damages sustained, either
jointly or severally. Borough of Carlisle
v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 5.50. Now, if the
driver's negligence is to be imputed to the
passenger, the plaintiff cannot recover.
Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151;
Phila. & Reading R. Co. v. Boyer, 97 Pa.
91.
This question first arose in the celebrated
English case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 0.
B. 115, in which it was held "that a pas-
senger in one omnibus, injured by a col-
lision caused by the negligence of the
driver, wis so identified with such driver
as to prevent his recovery of damages, he-
eause of the driver's contributory uegli-
gence." This case was overruled in "The
Bernia," L. R. 13 App. Cas., a later Eng-
lish case.
In the case of Little v. Hackett, 116 U.
S. 366, the Supreme Court of the United
States held "that a person who had hired
a public hack, and had given the driver
directions as to the place to which he
wished to be conveyed, but exercised no
control over the conduct of the driver, was
not responsible for the latter's acts of neg-
ligence, nor prevented from recovering
against a railroad company."
The counsel for the railroad company
contends that the plaintiff ought to be
non-suited, according to the Pennsylvania
case of Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa.
151, which held, "that where a passenger
in a carrier vehicle is injured by a collision
resulting from the negligence of those in
charge of it and those in charge of another
vehicle, the carrier only is answerable for
the injury." And the same doctrine was
applied in Phila. & Reading R. Co. v.
Boyer, 97 Pa. 91.
Both of these Pennsylvania decisions
have been overruled. Dean v. Penna. R.
Co., 129 Pa. 514; Bunting v. Hoguth, 139
Pa. 363.
In the late case of Jones v. Lehigh & N.
E. R. Co., 202 Pa. 83, Justice Fell said in
his opinion: " A driver's negligence is
not, as the law now settled, to be imputed
to the occupants of the vehicle, and as this
is the law in Pennsylvania, as it is to-day,
the court cannot do otherwise than direct
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
J. RALSTON JONES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
It was error to direct a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. The driver of the omni-
bus saw the train, and knew that it was
very soon going to move. It started, for
some reason, a half-minute sooner than
usual, but the bourt could not say that
this was negligence. It did not ring or
whistle, but it would be, we think, for the
jury to say whether this omission was,
under the circumstances, causative of the
accident. Would the driver have refrained
from crossing had the ringing or whistling
occurred? Would it have been a better
indication to the driverof what was about
to happen than that which he discovered
by his eye? He saw the train, and he
urged his horses over the track, believing
that he could cross. If the ringing or
whistling would have shown to the driver
more clearly than what he saw that the
advance of the train was imminent, and
he would have refrained from making the
attempt to cross, the company would have
negligently caused the accident. But it
was for the jury to say so.
The court has so ably disposed of the im-
putability of the driver's negligence to his
passengers, and, inter alios, to the plain-
tiff, that we are content to dismiss the
question without further discussion.
Judgment reversed, with v.f. d. n.
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TEMPLE vs. JAMISON.
Resulting trust-Act of June 4, 1901, P. L.
425, construed as making resulting trusts
void only as against bonafide purchasers
and mortgagees for value, where its pro-
visions are disregarded-A mort qagee
for a.past debt not apurchaser for value
-Neither is a devisee a purchaser for
value.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
With Sarah Jamison's money, $4,000,
her husband, John, undertook to buy, and
bought, a farm, in the deed for which,
however, he only was named as grantee.
He and his wife moved on the farm. A
year after, without her knowledge, he
made a mortgage for $2,000 upon the farm,
for a loan of money previously made to
him. The mortgagee, William Temple,
devised this mortgage specifically to his
son, John, estimating it at its face value,
and giving to the other three children
$2,000 each. The will stated his intention
to give the four children equal shares.
Subsequently William Temple sued on the
bond accompanying the mortgage, and
caused a sheriff's sale of the farm. becom-
ing the buyer. At the sale, he was noti-
fied before his bid that defendant'claimed
the land, as having her lien by a resulting
trust.
LONG for the plaintiff.
A resulting trust is void as to bonafide
judgment or other creditors, orimortgagees
of the holder of the legal title, or purchaser
from such holder, unless either a declara-
tion of trust in writing has been executed,
acknowledged and recorded, or an action
of ejectment by the cestui que trust has
been begun. A wife may bring such an
action against the husband. Act of June
4, 1901, P. L. 425.
To claim a resulting trust, there must
have been an intention at time land was
purchased to take title in name of cestui
que trust, as well as use of her money.
Corman's Appeal, 197 Pa. 125 ; Crawford
v. Thompson, 142 Pa. 551. This evidence
must be clear and convincing. Todd v.
Campbell, 8 Casey 250 ; Strimpfier v. Rob-
erts, 6 Harris 298; Kline's Appeal, 139 Pa.
463.
A pre-existing debt is a valuable consid-
eration, and receipt of security therefor
makes one a bonafide purchaser. Okie v.
Kelley, 12 Pa. 323.
MCNEAL for the defendant.
A resulting trust arises in favor of one
whose money is used for the purchase of
land and title is made to another. Strimp-
fler v. Roberts, 18 Pa. 283; Barnet v.
Dugherty, 8 Casey 371.
There is no presumption of a gift where
wife pays purchase money and deed is
taken in the name of the husband. Beck's
Executors'v. Graybill & Suartly, 28 Pa. 66.
Act of 1901 does not apply, because a
creditor who takes a mortgage or note only
as security for a pre-existing debt, and not
for money advanced at the time, is not a
purchaser for value. Ashton's Appeal, 73
Pa. 153; Petni v. Clark, 11 S. & R. 377 ;
Hartman v. Doudel, 1 Rawle 280; Twelor
v. Williams, 3 Whart. 405; Trotter v.
Shippen, 2 Barr 358.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Jamison, with his wife's money, pur-
chased a farm, taking title to same in his
own name. This is sufficient to establish
primafacie a trust in the wife's favor, but
which is liable to be overthrown by proof
that the payment was a gift of the money
to her husband, the holder of the legal
title. But where the evidence does not
show the intent of the parties in the
transaction, the presumption is, not that
the payment was meant as a gift, but that
the grantee consented to take and to hold
the title in trust for the person advancidg
the money. Lynch v. Cox, 23 Pa. 265.
We, therefore, hold that before our recent
legislation on the subject of resulting
trusts, this would clearly have been such
in favor of the wife.
The Act of June 4, 1901, provides, that
whenever such resulting trust arises, if the
person advancing the money has capacity
to contract, such resulting trust shall be
void and of none effect as to bona fide
judgment or other creditors, ormortgagees
of the holder of the legal title, unless
either a declaration of trust in writing has
been acknowledged by the holder of the
legal title and recorded, or unless an action
of ejectment has been begun by the person
advancing the money. Now, the wife, as
we all know, had power to contract.
And again, we find that she has not
complied with the provisions of the above
statute. But we do not think that these
things enter into the case.
The question is, as we look at it, was
Temple such a mortgagee as courts will
construe the word to mean under the Act
of June 4, 1901? Temple took the mort-
gage as security for a loan previously made
to Jamison.
The loan may have been made even be-
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fore thefarm was purchased. Atall events,
it appears that the mortgage was given for
a pre-existing debt. Wehavein Pennsyl-
vania a line of cases preceding and follow-
ing Ashton's Appeal, 73 Pa. 153, which
hold, that where a creditor, who takes a
mortgage, note or other chose in action,
only as security for a pre-existing indebt-
edness, and not for money advanced at the
time, is not a purchaser for value.
We think the present case is not incon-
sistent with the line of cases referred to
above.
Believing, therefore, that Temple was
not such a mortgagee as the statute re-
quires, even though the trust was not in
writing and recorded, nor ejectment
brought, we render judgment in favor of
the defendant, thereby holding that them
is a resulting-trust in her favor.
PAUL 0. MENGES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
A resulting-trust in favor of Sarah Jami-
son arosg from the grant to her husband.
He had her money for the purpose of buy-
ing the land, and he undertook with her
to buy it for her. The question is, can
this trust be set up againstJohn Jamison's
mortgagee ?
Mrs. Jamison was in possession when
the mortgage was made, and this, perhaps,
would have been sufficient notice, prior to
the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 425. That
act, however, declares resulting-trusts void
as to bona fide judgment or other cred-
itors or mortgagees of the holder of the
legal title, or purchasers from such holder,
unless either a declaration of trust in writ-
ing has been executed, acknowledged and
recorded, or an action of ejectment by the
cestui que trust has been brought. It.
authorizes a wife to bring such action
against her husband.
Neither of these things has been done.
There is no written and recorded declara-
tion of trust. No ejectment had been
brought prior to the making of the mort-
gage.
The trust is, in terms, invalidated with
respect to bonafide mortgagees. Literally,
William Temple is such. He had no no-
tice of the trust. The debt, to secure which
the mortgage was accepted, was an actual
debt. We do not think, nevertheless, that
it was the intention of the Legislature to
dispense with the mortgagee's being.a pur-
chaser for value, when securing to him
immunity from the assertion of the trust.
In a vast array of cases, in alljurisdictions,
it has been held that, in order to be pro-
tected from the ownership of others than
the one with whom a party deals, he must
give value in reliance on the title with re-
spect to which he deals. To be protected
by the recording acts, he must be not a
bonafide purchaser only, but one for value.
The same is true in order to be protected
from secret trusts. Adamson v. Souder,
205 Pa. 498. Defenses to a negotiable note
are available only to a purchaser forvalue.
It could not have been the intention of
the Legislature to change the law in this
important respect.
Is, then, the plaintiff, who assails the
trust, a bonafide purchaser for value?
The debt was a pre-existing debt. No
surrender of any right was made by the
mortgagee when he accepted the mortgage.
He retained all the rights he had had. He
simply added to them the rights of a mort-
gagee. He was not, therefore, a purchaser
of the mortgage for value. He gave noth-
ing for it. Adamson v. Souder, 205 Pa.
498; Callendar v. Kelly, 190 Pa. 455;
Pratt's Appeal, 77 Pa. 378.
But, it is possible that, though William
Temple himself was not a purchaser for
value, John Temple is such a purchaser.
If so, he will doubtless be protected, as
William Temple would have been. The
mortgage was devised to John specifically,
at the valuation of $2,000. But a devisee
or legatee is not a purchaser for value.
But for the devise to him, John would,
doubtless, have shared in the other prop-
erty of William Temple, but as this prop-
erty never was John's, he cannot be said
to have purchased the mortgage by relin-
quishing his right to a share in the other
property. William, as owner, could do
what he would with his own.
But, It is not John that enforced the
mortgage, but William himself. He fore-
closed the mortgage by obtaining judg-
ment on the accompanying bond, andsell-
ing upon it the premises in dispute. He
became the buyer. If we suppose that,
under the bequest of the mortgage, the
land would pass to the legatee, John, John
cannot be deemed a purchaser for value.
The ownership of William was impaired
by the notice, at the sheriff's sale, of Sarah
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Jamison's title. William, therefore, did
not improve his position, as against the
trust, by %is purchase. It could be asserted
successfully against him. As John paid
nothing for the land, but got it as a de-
visee, he is not a purchaser for value, and
the trust can be enforced against him.
The Act of 1901 requires the recordingof
a declaration of trust, or the bringing of
an ejectment. But, as ejectment is de-
signed to recover possession, it is not to be
supposed that the Legislature had in view
a case in which the cestui que trust was
already in possession. If we apply the Act
of 1901 to Mrs. Jamison, we practically say
that unlessshe was able to procure a decla-
ration of trust from her husband before the
latter mortgaged the land, she would lose
her land. It does not appear that she in-
tended the deed from her vendor to be
made to her husband. How is she to be
held responsible for his making himself
the grantee without her authority? What
she would properly be responsible for
would be her refraining, after notice of the
form ofthe deed, from filing a bill in equity
to compel a declaration of trust, or from
asserting ownership by taking possession.
It could scarcely have been the intention
of the General Assembly to forfeit her
trust simply because she had not obtained
a declaration of trust when she was in
possession. We do not think John Tem-
pie qualified to dispute the validity of the
trust.
Judgment affirmed.
SARAH TWILLER vs. LIFE INS. CO.
Evidence-Life insurance-Power of offi-
cers and agent of company to testify, and
competency of wife considered under Act
May 25, 1887.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
William Twiller obtained on his life a
policy for $2,000. The policy stipulated
that if, at the time of its issue, the assured,
whether he knew it or not, had any seri-
ous disease, such as consumption, cancer,.
Bright's disease, etc., it was to be void.
He dying, his administrator sues the com-
pany on the policy, which alleges that he
had consumption at the time of taking the
insurance. The company called Sarah
Twiller for cross-examination, and she was
compelled to testify. She said that her
husband had had certain described symp-
toms, and she believed the disease was
consumption. The president, the medical
examiner, and the agent of the company
who took the application, testified for the
company to the bad state of the health of
the assured.
HASSERT for the plaintiff.
A husband or wife is not competent to
testify against the other in any case in
which the interests of the other are in-
volved. Pleasonton v. Nutt, 19 W. N. C.
120; Johnson v. Watson, 157 Pa. 454 ;
Sahms v. Brovin, 19 Phila. 448. The rep-
resentatives of the company are incoinpe-
tent to testify, one of the parties to the
contract being dead. P. & L. col. 4835;
Cites also Neely's Est., 4 Pa. C. C. 644;
Mell v. Barner, 13.5 Pa. 151 ; Wolf v. Wolf,
158 Pa. 62 ; Parry v. Parry, 130 Pa. 94;
Duffield v. Hue, 26 W. N. C. 387.
HELLER for the defendant.
Cited Act M\ay 23, 1887 ; also Boyd v.
ConshohockeiN Mills, 149 Pa. 363.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The persons rendered incompetent by
Clause "E," Section 5, of the Act May 23,
1837, are described as "Any surviving or
remaining party tosuch thing or contract,
or any other person whose interest shall
be adverse to the said right of such de-
ceased, or lunatic party." Thus, parties
whose interest is adverse to the right of
the deceased party may be composed either
of surviving or remaining parties to the
thing or contract in action, or of persons
not a party thereto. Trickett on Wit-
nesses, sec. 185.
In the case at bar the evidence of the
president of the corporation, which was a
party to the thing in action, was allowed
to testify as to matters occurring before the
death of the other party to the contract, to
wit: the insured. His testimony was ad-
verse to the interest of the deceased, as it
tended to prevent a recovery on the con-
tract of insurance. We are of the opinion
that the clause of the Act of 1887 referred
to, prohibited such testimony, and that it
was error to admit it.
The wife of the deceased was also called
as on cross-examination, ajpd compelled to
testify. Her testimony was also adverse
to the interest of her husband, the de-
ceased.
The law has exempted one spouse from
detriment by the adverse testimony of
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another. This testimony the witness can-
not give, if willing, nor, if unwilling, can
it be extorted from him. Callender v.
Kelley, 190 Pa. 455, and Rourke v. Mc-
Grath, 1 Brewster 302.
When the action is founded on the right
of a husband or wife, the husband or wife
cannot be compelled by the opposite party
to testify as on cross-examination under
the Act of 1865 or the Act of 1887. Trickett
on Witnesses, sec. 63.
These acts do not authorize one party
calling the husband or wife of the oppo-
site party. Trickett on Witnesses, p. 58;
Rourke v. McGrath, 1 Brewster 302, and
Callender v. Kelley, 190 Pa. 455.
In acivil or criminal proceeding to which
the husband or wife is a party, he or she
can object to calling the husband or wife
to testify against him or her, but the ob-
jection to competency can be made in other
cases also. Thus, in an action against an
administrator of an estate of which a mar-
ried woman was a legatee, the administra-
tor objected to the testimony against him
of the husband. Alcern v. Cook, 101 Pa.
313. In this case the administrdtor of the
deceased could object to the competency of
the wife.
We are of the opinion that it was error
to compel the wife to testify as on cross-
examination.
Judgment reversed, and venirefacias de
novo awarded.
C. A. SPENCER, J.
OPINION OF TRE SUPREME COURT.
In this action by the administratrix of
the assurca against the company, its pres-
ident, its medical examiner and an agent
testified for the defendant. The learned
court below has held that they were not
competent. Why? They were not par-
ties to theaction. They had nopecuniary
interest in it. They were plainly compe-
tent. Sargeant v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 189
Pa. 341 ; Witnesses, p. 144.
The administratrix, plaintiff, was called
by the defendant, and thecourt compelled
her to testify. Her testimony was adverse
to herown clain: The learned court below
has held that she could not be compelled to
testify. But why not?
Because the assured was dead? But,
her interest was not adverse, though her
testimony proved to be so, to the right of
the deceased. On the contrary, her testi-
mony was expected to be, and proved tb
be, adverse to her own interest.
Was she immulne from compulsion be-
cause she was a party? The Act of 1887
distinctly authorizes such compulsion.
Was she superior to compulsion because
she was the widow of the deceased? Hus-
band and wife cannot testify against each
other. But a surViving husband or wife
can testify against the administrator of the
other. He is not then testifying against
his wife. Witnesses, p. 64.
Facts disclosed in marital confidence, it is
true, cannot be compulsorily revealed after
the death of one spouse by the survivor.
Witnesses, 85. Had it appeared that the
fact to which Mrs. Twiller was required to
testify had been learned in that confidence,
compelling her to testify to it would have
been improper. But we see nothing indica-
tive that her testimony revealed any mat-
t.er learned by her through the confidence
of the husband. Any nurse or relative,
waiting on the husband, would have
learned the same facts. The mere fact that
she would not have been with him, and,
therefore, would not have learned that he
had consumption, does not make the fact
a communication. It doesnotappear that
she depended on his statements to her for
her knowledge of his disease. She would
not have known it had she not been his
wife, perhaps, just as the attorney, in
Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. 191, Witnesses,
14, would not have known the imbecility
of his client had he not been attorney, but
as the attorney did not, for that reason,
betray confidence in testifying to the im-
becility, so Mrs. Twiller does not betray it
in testifying to her husband's malady.
Cf. Witnesses, p. 87 et seq. It is not nch
to be wondered at that the judgment of
the court should be erroneous, in view of
the grossly inadequate investigation of
counsel. Scarcely a single apposite cita-
tion can be found on either brief. On one
of them only one case is cited, and this
citation and a short quotation from the
Act of May 23, 1887, constitute the whole
store of erudition of its author. Such pal-
pable indifference to duty cannot be too
severely censured.
The judgment of the Superior Court is
reversed, and the judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas is reinstated and affirmed.
THE FORUM
ARCHBALD vs. CUMBERLAND
VALLEY R. R. CO.
Assumpsit for damages-Public cariers
-eglqence-Act of God-Degree of
care to be exercised by public carriers.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Tie plaintiff bought a ticket from Har-
risburg to Carlisle from the defendant
company. A violent thunderstorm arose
during the trip, and a decaying tree, which
stood on rightof way of railroad company,
was struck by lightning and fell across the
track. Tile train was thereby thrown
from the track, and the passenger suffered
severe injuries, which resulted to him of
$500 for care, attention and loss of time.
On these facts he seeks to recover from
the defendant the said sum.
BARNER and BARNHART for the plain-
tiff.
Defendant is liable for failure to keep the
road in a safe condition. Hey v. Phila.,
81 Pa. 44; Sullivan v. P. & R. R. R. Co.,
30 Pa. 234.
The act of God would not have produced
the injury if the defendant had not been
negligent in failing to remove the tree.
Gleeson v. V. M. R. R. Co., 140 U. S. 435.
The fact of the derailment of the train is
of itself presumptive evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the defeindant. Cur-
tis v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534.
DAvIs and KAUFMAN, D. E., for the de-
fendant.
As to what constitutes an act of God.
Heibliz v. Allegheny Cemetery, 201 Pa.
171; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. S. C. I. School
District, 96 Pa. 65 ; Davis v. Morrison, 20
Pa. 171.
Before plaintiff can recover, he must
show that defendant company was guilty
of negligence which was the producing
cause of the injury.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The plaintiff's right to recover damages
in this case rests on the universal principle,
that he who, to the injury of another,
neglects a duty that by law he ought to
perform, is liable to compensate the injury.
An artificial person is equally liable to
the operation of this rule.
Public carriers of passengers exercise a
public calling, and by so doing have cer-
tain exceptional liabilities imposed on
them to which private carriers are not sub.
jeet.
A carrier of passengers is bound to exer-
cise toward passengers a very high degree
of care. The cases generally recognize that
the carrier must exercise the utmost care
under the circumstances short of a war-
ranty of the safety of the passenger. Wil-
lock v. R. R., 166" Pa. 184.
The carrier is bound to exercise extraor-
dinary vigilance, aided by the highest
skill. Hale on Bailments, 519.
Proof of an accident not resulting from
the act of the passenger is sufficient to raise
a presumption of actionable negligence on
the part of the carrier. Phila. & R. R. R.
v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 351.
The defendants have endeavored to re-
but this presumptioh by an attempt to
show that it was an inevitable accident,
that it was caused solely by an "act of
God," and that, as a consequence, they are
not liable.
It follows from the definition of an "act
of God," as an act of nature entirely un-
connected with any human agency, that
it must be the exclusive cause of the in-
jury, or the carrier will be liable.
The true test is the entire absence of any
human agency in producing the injury.
Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115.
Tile "act of God" must be such that, by
its own force, and independent of any
negligence on the part of the defendants,
would have produced the injury. The
cases all hold, that if there is a concurrence
of negligence with the act of God in pro-
ducing the injury, such "act of God" can-
not be set up as a defense.
It is true, that the mere existence of
negligence, which is not a producing cause
of the injury, creates no liability ; but if
the negligence shown is a producing cause,
it follows that the "act of God " was not
the exclusive cause, and the one guilty of
such negligence will be held liable. Phila.
& R. R. R. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 351.
The case, then, resolves itself down to
the question, whether or not the railroad
company was negligent in maintaining on
its rightof way a noticeably decaying tree.
A road may be perfectly safe undersome
circumstances, and very unsafe under
others. If the tree was decaying, it was
in imminent danger of Tailing across the
tracks, even though the danger was not
aggravated by a violent thunderstorm.
These violent actions of the elements
may be readily foreseen and guarded
against, and a failure to do so will ordina-
rily be negligence, which is regarded as
rio
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the proximate cause of the loss, rather
than the action of the elements.
From the fact that such violent actions
of the elements as a thunderstorm are com-
mon to this section of the country, even a
sound tree would be dangerous by reason
of its proximity to the railroad tracks, for,
frequently in such storms, limbs of sound
trees are blown down and might be blown
across the tracks, and it is not even com-
mon prudence to allow a decaying tree on
the property of the defendants to stand so
near the tracks, and their neglect in this
respect was such a producing cause of the
injury as will make them liable in this ac-
tion.
Judgment is accordingly entered for the
plaintiff.
F. P. BEN3"AMIN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
A " decaying tree," standing within the
way of the railroad, was struck by light-
ning, and, falling across the tracksagainst
the car of a passing train, injured the
plaintiff. Why is he to be indemified by
the company ?
Does the fact that the tree was standing
within the way make the company liable?
We cannot think so.
Does the fact that the tree was a" de-
caying tree" make it liable? It is the
duty, doubtless, of the company to exam-
ine its ties, rails, roadbed, its cars and en-
gines, everything pertaining to its road,
and thd vehicles that run over it, in order
to see that they are not possible causes of
injury. If there are trees near the track,
which it can control, it should doubtless
adopt means to prevent their becoming a
danger in consequence of decay, etc. If
the decay of the tree had occasioned its
fall, we might hold, with the learned court
below, that prima facie, at least, the com-
pany was responsible. Nothing shows,
however, that without the decay of the
tree it would not have fallen. We know
not the species of the tree, its size, the
character of the lightning discharge. We
cannot judicially know that this tree, of
which we apprehend so little, would not
have fallen from the lightning bolt, of
which we know equally little, had the tree
not been decayed. Nor do we know to
what extent the decay had advanced, nor
whether it was of such a sort that the ut-
most diligence would have detected it.
The tree is described, in the evidence, as
"decaying," rather than "decayed." Un-
less we are prepared to say that a rail-
road company cannot allow a tree to
stand within its way, without making it-
self, ipso facto, liable for any injury of
which the tree may become the instru-
ment, we do not see how, on the evidence
before the court below, we or a jury are to
say that the defendant was liable.
We concede that if the decay of the tree
had advanced so far that a reasonably
vigilant examination would have disclosed
it, and if, but for this decay, the stroke of
lightning would not have caused the in-
jury to the plaintiff, the defendant would
be liable. The learned court below well
says that thunderstorms must in this re-
giou be expected, and their not imnproba-
ble effects on trees anticipated, and the
proper precautions against resulting in-
juries adopted. But the doctrine which
the court has, in substance, announced is,
that the mere fact that a tree, which is
"decayinmg," and standing within the way
of a railroad, is prostrated by a. lightning
stroke, makes the company liable for the
consequent hurt. This weare unable to ac-
cept.
Judgment reversed, with v.f. d. n.
JARRED vs. STAPLES.
Sale of real property under administrator
-Balance of purchase price paid after
five years-Ejectment-Act of April 8,
1833.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The land of John Hipple, deceased, was
sold by his administrator, under the Or-
phans' Court, to William Jarred, who paid
two-thirds of the money, took possession,
but did not complete the payment or re-
ceive a deed. After a possession of five
years he died, leaving his widow, Sarah
Jarred. and a daughter, Hannah. His
administrator paid the purchase money
still due, and received a deed, naming
Sarah Jarred grantee of one-third for life,
and Hannah as grantee in fee, subject to
Sarah Jarred's interest. Hannah married
William Staples and died, leaving a son
to survive. The son died three months
after, his father surviving. Staples died,
leaving his mother his heir. Sarah Jarred
III
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is still alive, and claims the land in this
ejectment against William Staples, Sr.
JONES and CAREY for the plaintiff.
One not of the -blood from whom the
real estate descended, or by whom it was
given or devised to the intestate, cannot
take the real estate bv inheritance. Act
of April 8, 1833; Bevan v. Taylor, 7 S. &
R. 397; Perot's Appeal, 102 Pa. 235; Lewis
v. Gorman, 5 Pa. 164; M1cDowell v. Thomas,
13 Pa. 41 ; Maffit v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 258;
Robert's Appeal, 39 Pa. 417; Danner v.
Shissler, 31 Pa. 289; McWilliams v. Ross,
46 Pa. 369; Duffies' Estate, 13 Phila. 334.
JACOBS, J. W., and KAUFFMAN, D. E.,
for the defendant.
The fee vested in William Staples at the
death of the son, and upon his death his
only heir is his mother. Rauck's Appeal,
113 Pa. 98; Roger's Estate, 131 Pa. 382.
The administrator has the power to pay
the remaining purchase money. Parkin-
son's Appeal, 132 Pa. 450; Simpson v.
Hall, 4 S. & R. 337.
Upon the death of the mother, the feevested in the son, subject to the dower of
the widow. Act of 8th April, 1833, P. L.
315.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The land of John Hipple was sold by his
administrator, under rule of the Orphans'
Court. His property was sold to William
Jarred, who paid two-thirds of the pur-
chase price, took possession, but did not
receive adeed. After a period of fl:e years
he died, leaving a widow, Sarah Jarred,
and daughter, Hannah. His administra-
tor paid the purchase money still due and
received a deed, naming Sarah Jarred as
grantee of one-third for life, and Hannah
as grantee in fee.
This is all vory clear, and leaves room
for no argument. The administrator, in
paying the unpaid purchase money and
receiving in the deed the same interests as
they would have received had the property
come to them by descent, gave them such
an interest that the common law looks
upon them as taking by descent and not
by purchase, and it is so held in Kinney
v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. 141.
Hannah, the daughter, married William
Staples, and died, leaving a son to survive.
The son died three months after, his father
surviving. Staples died, leaving his mother
his heir. Sarah Jarred is still alive, and
claims the land in ejectment against Wil-
liam Staples, Sr. Upon the death of the
mother, Hannah Staples, the fee passed to
the son, according to the Act of 8th April,
1833, 1. The Act of 8th April, 1833, p,
provides, that no person who is not of the
blood of the ancestor, or other relations,
from whom the estate descended, or by
whom it was given or devised to the in-
testate, shall in any of the cases before
mentioned take any inheritance therein..
Now, under this provision we cannot see
how either the father, Sarah Jarred or
Mrs. Staples, Sr., can base any claim
whatsoever upon the property ih question,
as they are without blood relation to the
one from whom the property descended,
and such has been held by a long line of
cases in Pennsylvania, among them Mc-
Dowell v. Thomas, 13 Pa. 41: Robert's
Appeal, 39 Pa. 417; Maffit v. Clarke, 6 W.
&S. 258.
Since there is no one competent to in-
herit, the eleventh section of the Act of
8th April, 1833, comes to the rescue, and
states that in such ease the real as well as
the personal estate of an intestate shall
pass to and be enjoyed by the next of kin
of such intestate, without regard to the
ancestor or other relation from whom such
estate may have come, and this has been
interpreted in McDowell v. Thomas, 13 Pa.
41; Rauck's Appeal, 113 Pa. 98, and Roger's
Estate, 131 Pa. 383.
Inasmuch as the son has no heir who is
competent to inherit under the act stated
above, his father would be the one next of
kin, and to him the fee would pass; and,
upon the same grounds, upon the father's
death the property would pass to his
mother, who in this case is Mrs. Staples,
and it is the opinion of the court that, in
view of the statutes on the subject, apd
from the past interpretations placed upon
them, that the fee, in .default of takers by
blood relation, should pass to Mrs. William
Staples, and so the court decrees.
E. F. HELLER, J.
Per curiam.
Judgment affirmed.
BAUMHOFF vs. COOK, ET AL.
Assumpsit for damages-Contract between
corporation and private person, de-
pendent on legislation to be passed-
Demurrer to petition sustained on
grounds of "public policy."
STATEAENT OF THE CASE.
The Oklahoma City Electric and Gas
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and Power Co. is a corporation organized
under the laws of Oklahoma, with a capi-
tal stock of $150,000. Previous to Dec.
10th, 1901, and for some time after that
date, E. R. Cooke, G. W. Wheeler and G.
W. Beebe were the owners of the entire
(apital stock, and on that day entered into
a stipulation in writing, executed in the
name of the company and subscribbd by
them severally, whereby they agreed to
sell and transfer all the stock, together
with all the property and franchises of the
company to George W. Baumhoff for a




[n the consideration of the sum of one
dollar received from George W. Baum-
hoff, we hereby agree to sell to the
said George W. Baumhoff, his suc-
ces.sors or assigns, 1500 shares, consti-
tuting all the shares and capital stock
of the Oklahoma City Electric and
Gas and Power Company of the City of
Oklahoma, Territory of Oklahoma, of the
par value of one hundred dollars each, for
the sum of one hundred and twenty
thousand dollars, to be paid in cash.
This sale to be consummated within ten
days after an amendment duly passed by
ordinance enacted by the city council of
the City of Oklahoma, such amendment
to said ordinance to be mutually agreed
upon between the president and secretary
of said company and the purchaser before
to same is introduced in the council.
The above shares of stock shall convey
all the property, rights, privileges, grants
and franchises of said Oklahoma City Elec-
tric and Gas and Power Company, free
from all debts of all kinds, excepting a
sum not to exceed $2,000 for eight inch
gas pipe, now in the grounds and in route,
as billed from the Dimmick Pipe Com-
pany, of Birmingham, Ala., and one elec-
tric generator, from the Western Electric
Company, of St. Louis, Mo., at not to ex-
ceed $2.200, which the purchaser assumes
to pay for within ten days after the pas-
sage of the ordinance by the city council
and approved by the mayor of Oklahoma
City, 0. T., satisfactory to the purchaser.
The sum of $120,000, in cash, to be
paid by the purchaser within thirty
days after such ordinance amending the
franchise of said company satisfactory to
the purchaser is adopted. The purchaser
to take possession of the property at once
upon the payment of the entire consider-
ation of the property. It is further agreed
that any betterments which may be re-
quired, such as lamps, meters or wires
bought before December 30, 1901, shall be
paid f6r by the purchaser.
Oklahoma City Electric and Gas and
Power Company.
By E. H. COOKE, G. W. WHEELER,
Sec'y. Pres.




Shortly after this contract was made a
third party appeared and offered $20,000
more, or $140,000, for the same property on
the same terms. And a few days later
when Baumhofr returned prepared to
carry the transaction to a conclusion, the
sellers refused to proceed. Being unable,
after persistent efforts, to induce them to
proceed to carry out the contract, Baum-
hoff *returned to his home in St. Louis.
Shortly after he left, the contemplated
amendment was passed by the city coun-
cil and approved by the mayor, and on
learning of it he again returned to Okla-
homa City and offered payment and de-
manded performance of the contract,
which was refused. Previous to his ar-
rival the sale to the other parties for $140,-
000 had been so far concluded as to put it
out of the power of the defendants to de-
liver to him.
In providing for the means and making
preparations for the performance of the
contract he incurred expenses, which he
alleges exceed $50,000.
Being unable to secure or enforce the
contract he brought an action for damages
for its breach in the sum of $60,000, in the
District Court of Oklahoma County, 0. T.,
and a demurrer being filed to the petition
of the plaintiff, which, on being heard
was sustained, and shortly thereafter an
amended petition was filed and a de-
murrer to it also was sustained, on the
grounds that- the contract between the
parties hereto was against"Public Policy."
Now the plaintiff takes this appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Territory and prays
for judgment.
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HouCK for the plaintiff.
The contract was not opposed to public
pllicy,and thereby rendered illegal. Lewis
v. Davison, 4 M. & W. 6.53; Lord Hlowden
v. Simpson. 37 E. C. L. 429; Milbank v.
Jones, 147 N. Y. 370.
The contract did not create an agent for
an undisclosed principal. Fuller v. Dant,
18 Pick. (Mass.) 480; Clippinger v. Hep-
baugh, 5 W. & S. 315.
Contracts to secure legislation, declared
void as against public policy, have been
cases where one of the coutracting parties
has been the agent of the other, and was
to have a contingent fee, or to use his per-
sonal influence, or other improper means.
In no case are the rights of third persons,
not parties to securing the proposed legis.
lation, affected by the methods used in its
procurement. Hatzfield v. Gulden.7Watts
(Pa.) 152; Spaldini v. Ewing, 149Pa. 375;
Mills v. M[ills, 40 N. Y. 543; Marshall v.
B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 How. (U. S) 314;
Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200.
FLYNN for the defendant.
The character of legislation to be passed
is immaterial. Trist v. Child, 21 Wall.
(U. S ) 441 ; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana
i Ky.) 366 ; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen 152.
In order to render a contract in violation
of law illegal, it is not necessary that there
shall exist any corrupt intention on the
part of the contracting parties. Senala
Bank v. Lamb, 26 Bart. (N. Y.) 595. Nor
does it matter that nothing improper was
done or expected to be done; it is enough
that such is the tendency of the contract.
Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315 ;
Hlatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts 152; Spald-
ing v. Ewing, 149 Pa. 375 ; Must v. Child,
21 VaII. (U. S.) 441.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Plaintiff's case in the court below was
demurred to on the ground that the writ-
iug therein declared on and proved did not
in la:w constitute a valid contract, the same
being challenged as contrary to good pub-
lic policy, and, consequently, illegal and
void. This demurrer being sustained, he
brings this appeal.
It may be declared as unquestionable
law that, under equal powers, no distinc-
tions, no differences whatever, exist be-
tween the contracts of a corporation and
those of a natural person, either as to form,
consideration or subject matter. So that,
without reciting at length all the facts
which make this concern a perfect artifi-
cial person under our laws, we may say ii
brief, as it was a going concern, having
the management and possession of its
property, and possessedof all rights, privi-
leges and duties of such a person, all legal
principles which apply to the contracts of
any person, apply with equal force to this
one. Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 240;
Vreeland v. Stone, 29 N. J. Eq. 188; Ram-
sey v. Manufacturing Co., 116 Mo. 313;
Bradley v. Poole, 98 Mass. 169.
The crucial question is, was there any-
thing contrary to public policy in thestip-
ulation of the contract that an ordinance
amending thecity ordinance, then in force,
granting certain franchises to the corpora-
tion, should be mutually agreed upon be-
tween the parties, and passed by the city
council, before the sale and transfer con-
tracted for should be consummated?
Stipulations, in principle and character
very similar to thisone, have received some
judicial sanction in England (Lord How-
den v. Simpson, 37 E. 0. L. 429; Lewis v.
Davison, 4 M. & W. 6.56), but we cannot
accept this precedent as of any weight in
this State, owing chiefly to certain violent
contrasts between the legislative processes
in the cobigress and legislative bodies of
this country, and of its several States, and
those in that of England, particularly in
reference to private acts, and their passage.
The argument that when a contract is
made in general terms broad enough to
include things lawful and unlawful, it
shall be presumed that they intended those
only which are lawful, is a cogent and un-
answerable argument only where the con-
tract is alleged as void on the ground that
it contains stipulations to do unlawful acts.
Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 481.
Our law goes further than merely to an-
nul contracts where the obvious and
avowed purpose is to do, or cause the do-
ing, of an unlawful act. It is sufficient
that it be deleterious to private morals, in-
jurious to public welfare, or antagonistic
to the integrity of domestic, civil or politi-
calinstitutionsof a State. And noheight
of character, or integrity in the parties, or
the absence of matter suggesting a proba-
bility of resort to improper influences, will
have any effect to ward off the branding
stamp of the law's disapprobation. Trist
v. Child, 21 Wall. 441; Jones v. Randall,
1 Cowper 39; Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R.
Co., 16 Hlaw. 314. Such contracts as cre-
ate a strong incentive to the exercise of
personal and sinister extraneous secret in-
fluences upon legislative orjudicial author-
ities, or which create any personal or
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pecuniary interest in legislation, are abso-
lutely void from their very inception, and
where a contractual interest is contingent
on the passage of a bill, it is the law, that
it is such a direct incentive to the exertion
of more than legitimate influences as to
constitute such a void contract. It is not
material that nothing improper was done,
or was expected to be done, by any party
or parties to the contract, either directly
or indirectly. It is enough that such is
the tendency of the contract, that it will
lead necessarily, in the hands of designing
and corrupt men, to improper tampering
with such authorities as stand at the head
of our legislative or judicial departments,
to the deceiving or misleading of either all,
or of even a part of them, or of a single
member. Brown v. Brown, 34 Barb. (N.
Y.) 533; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200;
Chesebrough v. Canover, 140 N. Y. 382;
Clippinger v. Shepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 317;
Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana (Ky.) 366; Mar-
shall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., supra; Hatz-
field v. Gulden, 7 Watts 1.52 ; Bowman v.
Coifroth, 59 Pa. 19; Armerod v. Dearman,
100 Pa. 561 ; Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 48-
56. So careful is the law to exclude all in-
fluences, such as these, that it has been
decided that a concealnent of the fact that
one securing the passage of an act was an
agent, acting for a compensation or inter-
est. contingent, either by agreement so to
conceal, or even in the absence of such
agreement if, in fact, he did so conceal,
would render the agreement for compen-
sation void. Also, a contract founded on
a valuable consideration, which contem-
plated the amendment of a bill in the Leg-
islature in course of passage, or considera-
tion so as to limit franchises thereby to
be granted to certain parties other than
the grantees named in the bill, or an agree-
ment that it should be amended from time
to time in such manner as should be agreed
upon by and between the said parties to
the contract, is equally void in its every
part; and further, that a contract which
contemplated the transfer for a valuable
consideration of franchises to be granted
to a firm for the privilege of operating a
street railway, is void as against public
policy. Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 546. It is
true, as has been contended in this case,
that each member might act in relation
to the measure entirely free and uninflu-
enced, voting according to his conscielee
and judgmentupon thesame when it canme
before him as a legislator. This might
either be actually so or only apparently.
But would such a policy of winking down
the real essence of danger on a mere possi-
bility strike down in its very inception a
possible stealthy and selfish personal influ-
encing, which, though veiled well, is deadly
still, controlling the vote and directing it,
fettering and trammeling "the conscience
none the less, because its touch is so artis-
tically light and its rein so gentle in its
guidance as not t. rudely shock an unsus-
pecting one by its presence? We cannot so
decide. The condemnation of such con-
tracts rests upon theircorrupting tendency.
Absence of motive to do wrong will secure
sanction of the courts; presence of such in
either party, or in the Legislature, its cer-
tain prohibition. We think a motive to
do wrong exists in this case. Whatever
the privilege or immunity sought under
the amendment may have been is not ma-
terial, but "it may be assumed to have
been of a pecuniary value." Such a con-
tract as this is a contract leading to the
use of secret, improper and corrupt tam-
pering with the legislative arm of our gov-
ernmental system. TMills v. Mills, supra;
Fuller v. Dame, supra; Sedgwick v. Staun-
ton, 14 N. Y. 289; Frost v. Allen, 6 Allen
159; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 281; Spauld-
ing v. Ewing, 149 Pa. 375.
There is no difference whatever in sound
legal principle and in logical effect be-
tween an express stipulation in a written
or oral agreement to pay either a definite
or a contingent sum, as a percentage of a
definite or contingent sum, the possibility
of securing either of which sums or in-
terests at all, as well as its size, may or
may not depend on the mere suscepti-
bility of a party in interest under the con-
tract to yield to a temptation of resorting
to corrupt and illegitimate influences in
order to secure the promised benefit, and
that of a contract between parties, the con-
summation of which and the benefits conse-
quent and dependent thereon, can flow
only when a specific piece of legislation is
duly passed, when in the former as in the
latter, a specific piece of legislation is con-
templated. Each looks to the passage of
the act on which its interests are depend-
ent. One says "this legislation I want'
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and offers a sum either definite or con-
tingent on the passage of the act. The
other says, "The subject matter of this
contract I want and the legislation I
want, but I don't want the subject matter
without the legislation," and specifies the
price embodying inducement stifficient to
be accepted, be it real or imaginary as to
its substantiality. The property may or
it may not be very much desired. The
legislation may be very much the more
desired as it generally is or it may be
but secondary. However this may be, it
is not material so far as the even eye of
the law and public policy is concerned.
It is sufficient that it offers such tempta-
tions and possibilities as the law abhors.
The property involved in such a case, too,
may be but a mere blind to the real
essence of the transaction for the conceal-
ment of a gigantic and perfidious piece of
lobbying. If such a contract as this could
be sustained an avenue both easy of access
and broad and free would be opened at
once for all into the very heart of all legis-
lation, whether municipal, State or federal,
or all of these.
The judgment of the learned District
Court on the demurrer was right and is,
therefore, affirmed. Yocum, J.
Per curiam..
Judgment affirmed.
IN RE ESTATE OF CATHARINE
BURKE, )DECEASED.
Decedent's Estate-The right of a hus-
band to administer the estate of his wife,
upon his death before remuneration,
passes to his administrator and through
him to his children.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Catharine Burke died on the 26th day
of January, 1902, intestate, and the Regis-
ter of Wills did on the 17th day of Feb-
ruary, 1902, grant letters of administra-
tion on her estate to John Holder, a
brother of the decedent. The said Catha-
rine Burke left to survive her no children,
but a husband, Samuel Burke, who died
on the 1st day of February, 1902, without
administering on his wife's estate or re-
nouncing his right to administer or ap-
pointing any one to administer in his
stead.
Samuel Burke left to survive him chil-
dren by a former marriage, to wit: Frank,
Sarah, Maud and Helen Burke. Helen
Burke, now Mrs. Helen Foj, petitions the
Register of Wills for a citation upon John
Holder to show cause why the letters
granted to him should not be revoked
by the Register and the petitioner ap-
pointed.
The Register of Wills dismissed the
petition and refused to revoke the letters
of administration granted to John Holder.
Mrs. Helen Foy appeals to the Orphans'
Court.
LONG for appellant.
Upon the death of a married woman
without issue her separate personal estate
passes to the husband -absolutely. Act of
1848, P. & L. Dig. Col. 9910.
Upon the death of the husband the
property will descend to his children, and
being entitled to the property are entitled
to letters of administration based on the
ground of interest. EllenLaker's Estate,
4 Watts 34; Davis' Estate. 14 Lancaster
Bar 182; Page's Estate, 75 Pa. 89; Coover's
Appeal, 52 Pa. 427; Deginther's Appeal,
83 Pa. 337; Jones' Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 249.
MENGES for appellee.
On a woman's death her chattels and
choses in action go into administration
and not to her husband by survivorship.
Page's Estate, 75 Pa. 89; Gibb v. Phila.
Saving Fund Society, 153 Pa. 345.
The right of administration with regard
to order is (1) husband or wife, (2) lineal
descendants, (3) father or mother, (4)
brothers and sisters. P. & L. Dig. Col.
1465. Note 4.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
According to the weight of authority
in Pennsylvania, letters of administra-
tion are granted according to the interest
in the estate, 4 Watts 34, and the statute
provides the.order in which the grant
shall be made. 1." Husband or wife, 2.
lineal descendants, 3. father or mother,
4. brothers or sisters, etc., P. & L. C. 1465.
The appellant, Mrs. Helen Foy, does not
come within the classification, whereas
the appellee, John Holder, is under the
fourth. We cannot see that the appellant
had any other than a prospective interest
in the estate of Catharine Burke. While
it is true that Samuel Burke had the prior
right to letters of administration, yet it
does not appear that he attempted to ex-
ercise this right, which being a personal
one, died with him, and did not descend
to his heirs.
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It appears from the facts that an ad-
ministrator was necessary-and after his
appointment the estate passed into his
control, and not into the control of Samuel
Burke. 75 Pa. 89; 153 Pa. 45. Appellant
had a prospective interest only till
after the administration. On thecoutrary,
appellee was next of kin and first in
interest.
We admit appellant's 1st and 2nd
points. But they presuppose a condition
of affairs which rarely occurs, viz: No
debts; no money in bank; no property ex-
cept that which may be handed over to
the one entitled, without any administra-
tiou. We do not think this was the case
here, or there would have been no admin-
istrator in the first place. As there was
an administrator appointed there must
have been property such as would necessi-
tate his appointment, and upon his ap-
pointment the personal estate passed into
his control and not into the control of
Samuel Burke. Therefore, the control of
the property, for which the appellant con-
tends and claims from her father, could
not descend to her.
Whenever letters of administration are
necessary the Register havingjurisdiction
shall grant them to such relation as he
shall judge will best administer the estate,
preferring those so entitled as are in the
nearest degree of consanguinity with the
decedent, and also preferring males to
females. P. & L. 1463-77. It is left
largely to the discretion of the Register,
within certain limits, who shall be ap-
pointed. We think he has kept within
these limits and see no valid reason for




OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The husband of Mrs. Burke was entitled
to letters of administration. He died,
however, after her, not having applied for
letters. As Mrs. Burke left no issue, her
husband was entitled to all her personal
estate. The principle of the 22nd section
of the Act of March 15, 1832, is, that letters
shall be granted to such persons as receive
the personal estate. The husband receiv-
ing all, could have nominated another to
act as administrator, and his nominee
would have been entitled. Coover's Ap-
peal, 52 Pa. 427. He did not do this. On
his death, his right to the wife's estate has
passed to his administrator, and through
him, to his children, of whom there are
four, two sons and two daughters. One of
these, we think, should receive the letters.
John Holder is in no sense interested in
his sister's estate, and should not be al-
lowed ti intermeddle with it.
By the analogy of the 22nd section,
supra, perhaps the sons of Samuel Burke
should be preferred to the daughters. But
it does not appear that there is any con-
test between them. The real contest is
between them and Holder. They, we
think, or their representative, should re-
ceive the letters. Bair's Estate, 14 Lanc.
Bar 182; 7 P. & L. Dig. 11353.
Decree reversed, and Orphans' Court di.
rected to order the Register to revoke the
letters to Holder and grant letters to Helen
Burke, unless cause be shown why some
one else should receive them.
CHARLES JONES, TO USE OF WM.
TEALE vs. HORWITZ.
Mortgages-Promise of vendee of mort-
gagor to pay mortgage only binding
when in writing either dehors or in the
mortgage-In the absence of a bond the
mortgagor is not personally liable fbr
any deficiency-Bight of mortgagee to
ue in name of mortgagor.
STATEMENT OF" THE CASE.
Charles Jones executed to Teale a mort-
gage for $2,000, on a tract of land worth
$4,000, and subsequently conveyed the land
to Horwitz for $2,000 plus the mortgage,
which Horwitz promised Jones to pay.
No bond or other personal liability on
Jones' part toward Teale executed. He
had simply the mortgage. Teale sold the
land on a judgment sur mortgage obtain-
ing only $1,800 of the debt, from the pro-
ceeds. He sues Horwitz for $200. Jones
files a disclaimer to the suit.
l. S. KAUFMAN for plaintiff.
The assignee of a mortgage may in an
action of assumpsit in Ehe name of the
mortgagor to his use recover fromn the
vendee of .the land who buys subject to
the mortgage. Thomas v. 4th St. M. E.
Church, 24 Pa. C. C. 642; Blood v. Levick
Co., 171 Pa. 328; Fehlinger v. Wood, et
at., 134 Pa. 517.
li8 THE FORUM
Mortgagee may use name of mortgagor.
Lenox to use of Crawford v. Bowers, 160
Pa. 191.
J. W. JACOnS for defendant.
A mortgage without a bond creates no
personal liability. Scott "v. Fields, 7
Watts 360.
Promise of vendee of land to pay a
mortgage isnot binding unless in writing.
Act June 12, 1878, P. L. 205; P. & L.
Dig. Col. 4063; Wonderlich v. Sadler, 189
Pa. 469; Blood v. Levick Co., 71 Pa. 328;
Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. 78; Davis'
Appeal, 89 Pa. 272, etc.
Vender must suffer loss before he can
maintain an action against vendee for
non-payment of mortgage. Moore's Ap-
peal, 88 Pa. 450.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This action is brought by Teale against
Horwitz to recover $200.
When Jones conveyed the land to
Horwitz there was a mortgage upon it,
due to Teale. The deed was not subject
to the mortgage, neither did it contain a
promise to pay. There was no special
circumstances here to raise a covenant to
pay this encumbrance and it, therefore.
amounts simply to an indemnity to the
vendor.
If Jones, at any time subsequently -to
the sale to Horwitz, had paid the mort-
gage, can there be any doubt that Horwitz
could be compelled in an action to re-
imburse Jones for such payment? McAbee
v. Cribbs, 194 Pa. 94.
We think this entirely changes the situ-
ation. It has been held in Scott v.
Fields, 7 Watts 366, that an action of debt
will not lieupon a mortgage which contains
no express covenant to pay, and, there-
fore, creates no personal responsibility. To
hold Horwi'z personally liable would be
in strict conflict with the Act of June 12,
1878. P. & L. Col. 4063, which enacted
that, "a grantee of real estate which is
bound by a mortgage shall not be person-
ally liable for payment of such mortgage,
unless he shall by an agreement in writ-
ing have expressly assumed a personal
liability therefor, or there shall be express
words in the deed of conveyance stating
that he is personally liable." No such
personal liability existed in this case,
either in writing or in the deed.
Suppose for a moment there was such a
personal liability, the question would be
whether Teale would have a right to
bringthe suit. The statute further enacts,
that the right to enforce such personal
liability shall not enure to any other per-
son than the one with whom such agree-
ment is made. Jones, being the person
with whom the agreement was made,
would be the right person to bring this
action, but in this case Jones files a dis-
claimer of the suit, thereby saying that he
takes no part in this action.
We. therefore, give judgment for the
defendant. HE NNEKE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
When Jones conveyed the land to
Horwitz, there was on it a mortgage for
$2,000, payable to Teale. Horwitz prom-
ised Jones to pay this mortgage. But
such a promise is not binding, unless it
was in writing. Act of June 12th, 1878,
P. L. 20.5; Fisher v. Reach, 202 Pa. 74;
Wonderlich v. Sadler, 189 Pa. 469. Tile
promise was not in writing.
Had there been in the deed to Horwitz,
words "statinu that the grant is made on
condition of the grantee assuming such
personal liability," these words would
have had the same effect as a promise in
writing. Act of June 12, 1878, supra.
There were no such words in the deed.
There was then on Horwitz's part, no
liability to Jones, from the mere fact of
receiving the conveyance for a price which
was less, by the amount of the mortgage,
than the agreed value, nor from Horwitz's
oral promise to pay the mortgage.
Horwitz simply assumed the liability of
indemnifying Jones in case he should be
compelled to pay any part of the mort-
gage debt. But there existed "no bond
or other personal liability on Jones' part
towards Teale." Jones, therefore, could
not be compelled to pay, nor has he in
fact paid, any part of the mortgage. No
violation of Horwitz's duty to indemnify
him has occurred, or can occur. An action
by Jones himself, for himself, must fail.
But this action has been brought by
Teale, in the name of Jones. Teale could
sue in his own name, in no case, neither
on a written promise, by Horwitz to pay,
had there been such, nor on the implied
promise to indemnify. He could sue,
however, in the name of Jones. Cf. Won-
derlich v. Sadler, 189 Pa. 469; Fisher v.
Reach, 202 Pa. 75.
But without an assignment of right of
Jones to him he could not use the name
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of Jones without Jones' consent. Not
only has Jones not authorized the use of
his name; but he has expressly dis-
claimed the suit of record. Teale can,
therefore, not maintain the action. Fisher
v. Reach, 202 Pa. 75. It follows that the
judgment of the learned court below must
be affirmed.
IN RE CANTRELL'S ESTATE.
Orphans' Court sale-Time sale, with in-
terest on purchase money-Apportion-
mdnt among creditors
STATEBMNT OF THE CASE.
Against Cantrell were judgments-one
for $2,000, one for $500, one for $275, one
for $375. The administrator obtained an
order to sell his land for the payment of
debts, which amounted to $4.000.
The terms of the sale allowed the pur-
chaser to retain the money eighteen
months. The price was $2,000. Eighteen
months after the sale that sum, plus $180
interest, was paid by the purchaser.
Holmes, who owns the first judgment,
claims the $2,180. Teddloom, who owns
the $500, claimsthe$180. All the creditors
claim that they should share i, pro rata.
W. L. HOUCK for Holmes.
The creditors by judgment herein are to
be paid according to the priority in date of
their judgments. Girard v. McDermott,
5 W. &S. 128.
As a general rule, interest ceases on liens
divested by a sheriff's sale on the day of
the sale, and, in casesof an Orphans' Court
sale, on the day of confirmation. But,
like all general rules, it has its exceptions,
and the fact that the purchaser paid inter-
est up to the time the auditor has allowed
it, takes the case out of the general rule.
Snider's Estate, 13 Phila, 560 ; Ramsey's
A ppeal, 4 Watts 72.
Where there is a time sale, carrying in-
terest, as the installments of principal fall
due, the interest thereon should be divided
pro rata among the creditors, in propor-
tion to the amount each was entitled to
receive out of the principal. Burkholder's
Appeal, 94 Pa. 522; Meal's Estate, 13 Phila.
558.
LOURIMER for administrator.
Upon the saleof an insolvent's real estate
by an administrator, in pursuance of all
order of the Orphans' Court, for the pay-
mentof debts, the interestupon such claims
ceases from the time of the return and con-
firmation of Ithe sale, and will not be al-
lowed for the time between confirmation
and day of actual payment. Ramsey's
Appeal, 4 Watts 71; YZeatman's Appeal,
102 Pa. 297. Cited also, Breil's Appeal, 24
Pa. 511 ; Mason's Appeal, 8 Norris 402.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
In this case, the estate of Cantrell,
against which were judgments to the
anount of $4,000, was sold for $2,000. The
terms of the sale allowed tile purchaser
eighteen months within which to pay.
Upon payment, Holmes, who held the first
judgment for $2,000, claimed the interest
upon the purchase price, which amounted
to $180. The other judgment creditors
claim that the $180 should be divided
among them pro rata.
Holmes contends that he should receive
the $180; that he was, on the day of the
sale, entitled to the $2,000 absolutely, and
that as he has been compelled to wait
eighteen months for his money, he is en-
titled to the interest thereon.
The other creditors contend that, upon
the sale of real estate in pursuance of an
order of the court for the payment of debts,
the interest upon those debts ceases at the
return day of the order of sale.
In the argument before the auditor the
learned counsel referred to Ramsey's Ap-
peal, 4 Watts 71. The rule as laid down in
that case is as follows: "A sale, under the
order of an Orphans' Court for the pay-
ment of debts, is a judicial sale, and has
been assimilated in several cases to a sale
made by the sheriff under process of a
court of common law. Now, it cannot
but be admitted that interest ceases from
the time of the return and confirmation of
a sheriff's sale; and I see no reason, as a
general principle, to make a distinction
between a sale by the sheriff and a sale
under order of the court. * * * *
But there may be exceptions to this prin-
ciple."
The court does not indicate any of the
exceptions, but the auditor is ofopinion this
is one, and that the rule as laid down in
Snider's Estate, 13 Phila. 560, governs this
case, in which the court held that "as a
general rule, interest ceases on liens di-
vested by a sheriff's sale on the day of.
confirmation." But, like all general rules,
it has its exceptions, and the fact that the
purchaser has paid interest up to the time
the auditor has- allowed it, takes the case
out of the general rule. When the sale
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was made, Holmes, the first judgment
creditor, was entitled to have his judgment
paid in full, and the other creditors were
entitled to have their judgments paid in
order out of the remaining funds. But
Holmes' judgment took all the assets of
the estate. To compel Holmes to wait
eighteen months for his money, and not to
allow him its earnings, is neither just nor
equitable.
Burkholder's Appeal, 94 Pa. 522, al-
though not a parallel case, lays down the
rule which should control cases like the
one under discussion. In this case there
was an assignment for the benefit of cred-
itors, an order from the court for a sale, a
sale and confirmation by the court. The
money in the hands of the auditor, and
the interest thereon, was held to belong to
the creditors, who were entitled to the
principal from which it accrued, and should
be distributed among them in proportion
to the amount of their respective distribu-
tive shares, and the length of time the
payment of these shares is respectively
postponed on account of the deferred in-
stallments of purchase money.
Applying these principles to the case in
hand, the auditor finds that Holmes is en-
titled to the $2,000, besides interest there-
on for eighteen months,amounting to $180.
W. C. SMITH, Auditor.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The interest of the Cantrell heirs in the
land was extinguished by the confirma-
tion of the sale, and the debts, which were
a lien on it, were then divested. They
were then entitled to payment. The pur-
chase money was$2,000, and it would have
all been consumed in the payment of the
first judgment. By some arrangement
with the purchaser, the payment was de-
ferred, he agreeing to pay interest on the
money. The learned auditor has properly
held that the interest thus earned belonged
to the owner of the money which produced
it, and he was the owner of the first judg-
ment. This is the doctrine, of Browns-
ville Deposit Bank's Appeal, 98 Pa. 347;
Burkholder's Appeal, 94 Pa. 522; Cf.
Cowden's Estate, 1 Pa. 267; Rice's Ap-
peal, 79 Pa. 208; Wilhelm's Estate, 182
Pa. 281; Yeatman's Appeal, 102 Pa. 297.
Exceptions dismissed and report con-
firmed.
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